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I. INTRODUCTION
In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc.,' the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified the absence
of a proscription on patents for business methods.2 In the short period of
time since the State Street decision, the number of applications filed for
business method patents has steadily increased.3 In fact, the total num-
ber of applications filed for business method patents remains under one
percent of total patent filings,4 and the rate of rejection of business
method applications is significantly greater than for other technologies.5
1. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
2. Id. at 1375.
3. A USPTO White Paper: Automated Financial or Management Data Processing Methods
(Business Methods), Ver. 1.43 USPTO at 7 (July 17, 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, Washington, D.C. Chapter of the
Internet Society (Oct. 3, 2000), available at http://www.oreillynet.com/pt/allpolicy/2000/10/23/
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Nonetheless, many commentators and industry watchdogs are predicting
the effect of the growing number of business method patents as
catastrophic.6
The noted internet law authority Lawrence Lessig believes that bus-
iness method patents will ultimately harm innovation on the Internet.7
Lessig warns of dire consequences should this trend continue, finding it
"the single greatest threat to innovation in cyberspace."8  Greg
Aharonian, a well known "patent-busting" consultant, 9 describes the
new business method patent movement as "a cold war," and dismisses
such patents as "just people playing legal games.""° Even Vint Cerf,
who actually co-invented the Internet while at DARPA," has said that
he believes that a number of the business method and software patents
"appear to be patents for what is well-known, widely known technology
that every undergraduate knows."' 2
Similarly, members of Congress have expressed concerns over the
recent deluge of grants of business method patents.' 3 While introducing
a bill 4 that would limit the protection afforded by business method pat-
ents, Representative Rick Boucher of Virginia summarized the senti-
ment among the technology community: "Not surprisingly, there has
been a great deal of concern in the high-tech community that the contin-
ued award of business method patents could lead to a significant amount
of wasteful litigation, could stifle the development of new technology,
isoc.html. In this discussion, Q. Todd Dickinson, director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, explained that the allowance rate for business method patents is fifty-seven
percent, as compared with sixty-seven percent for all patents.
6. See John T. Aquino, Patently Permissive: PTO Filings Up After Ruling Expands
Protection for Businesses and Net Software, 85 A.B.A. J. 30 (May 1999). "Some say virtually all
U.S. businesses could be affected by the [State Street] decision, which may be so broad as to
allow patenting of marketing techniques and business methods." Id. See also Robert P. Merges,
As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 580-81 (1999).
7. Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5.
8. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 12, 2000, at 46. Interesting,
ten days before the publication of Patently Absurd, Q. Todd Dickinson called the editors of the
N.Y. Times and then the Times' lawyers in an attempt to block the publication, indicating the
subject matter was particularly sensitive to him. See comments on Patently Absurd by the author,
James Gleick, available at http://www.around.com/patent.html.
9. Greg Aharonian runs Internet Patent News Service, a service devoted to providing prior
art and analyses of questionable internet and software patents. See generally http://www.bus
patents.com.
10. Gleick, supra note 8, at 47.
11. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
12. Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5.
13. Sabra Chartrand, Move in Congress to Limit the Protection of Business Methods, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at C2.
14. H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2000) (discussed infra).
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and could retard the development of the internet."' 5 Echoing similar
sentiments, Representative Howard Berman from California (Represen-
tative Boucher's co-author on the bill), questioned both the "quality and
appropriateness of the number of recently granted [business method]
patents." 
16
An especially dramatic example of the changing attitudes toward
business method patents is demonstrated by the outcry over Ama-
zon.com, Inc.'s "One-Click" patent.1 7 The patent covers a method and
system for purchasing items on the Internet using only a single action,
such as the click of a mouse.' 8 In 1998, Amazon founder and co-inven-
tor of the One-Click patent, Jeff Bezos, noted that a major competitor,
Barnes & Noble, had implemented a similar system called "Express
Lane" on their website. 19 Because the patent for One-Click had not yet
been granted, Bezos filed a "petition to make special,"2 the Patent
Office equivalent of an expedite order.2 Almost a year later, on Sep-
tember 28, 1999, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") granted U.S. Patent Number 5,960,411 to Amazon.com, Inc.22
On December 1, 1999, during the height of the holiday shopping season,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
awarded Amazon.com an injunction against Barnes & Noble, requiring
Barnes & Noble to insert an extra mouse click into its ordering
process.23
In the months following the decision, the high-technology commu-
nity manifested its outrage using a number of vehicles. For example,
Richard Stallman of the Free Software Foundation instituted a boycott
of Amazon.com and requested that other web sites link to his boycott
web page.24 A San Francisco organization called NoWebPatents.org
devoted their website to another boycott, and kept running totals of the
lost customers and sales resulting from the boycotts.25 Tim O'Reilly,
publisher of computer software books and an Internet pioneer, posted an
open on-line letter to Jeff Bezos asking Bezos to abandon the One-Click
15. 146 CONG. REC. E1651 (2000) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
16. 146 CONG. REC. E1659 (Oct. 4, 2000) (statement of Rep. Berman).
17. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
18. Id.
19. Gleick, supra note 8, at 44.
20. Advancement of Examination, 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (1994).
21. Gleick, supra note 8, at 48.
22. Amazon.com, Inc. v. BarnesandNoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (W.D. Wash.
1999).
23. Id. at 1249.
24. See Free Software Foundation, Why we Boycott Amazon, at http://www.gnu.org/
philosophy/amazon.html.
25. See NoWebPatents, at http://www.nowebpatents.org.
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patent to the public in the interest of preserving the pace of Internet
innovation.26 O'Reilly authored the open letter in response to requests
from consumers to stop selling his own books on Amazon.com. 27 Addi-
tionally, O'Reilly gathered 10,000 signatures for the open letter before
ending the call for signatures.28
Responding not only to O'Reilly, but also to calls from the high-
tech community calling for the unilateral abandonment of Amazon's
patents, Bezos penned his own open letter, explaining that his ethical,
legal, and fiduciary responsibilities to the company precluded abandon-
ment.29 In a stark contrast to that position, Bezos joined forces with
O'Reilly and Charles Cella in October 2000 to establish a web site
called Bountyquest.com. 30 The site allows "hunters" to win monetary
awards for supplying documentation that would invalidate patents listed
on the site. 31 This documentation, generally know as prior art, would
include anything demonstrating that the patented method was described
in a printed publication, in use, or on sale before the patented invention
was invented, or at least one year before the filing of the application for
the patent.32 Ironically, one of the first postings was Bezos's own One-
Click patent.33
The One-Click patent is one of a large number of questionable bus-
iness method and software patents. For instance, the PTO recently
granted Amazon.com, Inc. a patent for its affiliate program.34 This pat-
ent basically provides for a system where affiliates market items from
the Amazon.com catalog and are rewarded with a commission on each
sale.3 Entitled "Internet Based Customer Referral System, 36 the
scheme undoubtedly sounds familiar to hordes of sales professionals
across the country. Amazon's implementation of the affiliate program,
however, may be the first time the process had been applied to the
26. Letter from Tim O'Reilly, to Jeff Bezos, (Feb. 28, 2000), available at http://www.oreilly
net.com/cgi-bin/amazon-patent.comments.pl. (hereinafter O'Rilly letter). O'Reilly also maintains
a site of current news and commentary on software and business method patents, including a list
of questionable software patents. See http://www.oreillynet.com/patents.
27. Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5.
28. O'Reilly letter, supra note 26.
29. Letter from Jeff Bezos, An Open Letter from Jeff Bezos on the Subject of Patents, supra
note 26.
30. Sabra Chartrand, Patents: A Web Site Invites Hunters to Disprove Ownership of Ideas,
Even Those of Its Founders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at C8. See also http://www.bountyquest.
com.
31. Id.
32. See Conditions for patentability's novelty and loss of right to patent, 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1994).
33. Id. See also http://www.bountyquest.com.
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Internet.37
Indeed, the act of applying an existing business method to a com-
puter or to the Internet is a focus of much of the criticism directed at
business method patents. 38 A sampling of a few questionable patents
includes: Open Market's "Electronic Shopping Cart" 39 and Network
Sales System;40 Double-Click's method for delivery of advertisements;4
Netcentive's patent providing for a system to award frequent buyer
points;42 Trilogy's method for allowing purchasers to select options for
items they purchase over the Internet, such as cars ;43 and Priceline's
method for the on-line purchase of airline tickets using a reverse
auction. 44
For example, Priceline.com is illustrative of the problems with
computer-implemented, business method patents. The process referred
to in the Priceline.com patent is known as a reverse Dutch auction where
a plurality of sellers have the option of accepting the offered price.45
Many commentators, and indeed many laypeople, have argued that this
patent has been granted for a system that has been around for centu-
ries.4 6 Therefore, the question arises, how can someone get a patent for
something they did not invent? Moreover, since the only difference
seems to be the addition of the computer, 4 is not this invention an obvi-
ous modification of a centuries old practice?
Additionally, Priceline.com illustrates a burgeoning business in the
acquisition of intellectual property. Priceline.com started as a subsidiary
of Walker Digital, Inc. 48 Walker Digital is a company that procures pat-
ents for business systems it develops in house:
Walker Digital's strategy is to identify significant, unresolved busi-
37. See W. Scott Petty, Do Business Model Patents Provide an Unfair Competitive
Advantage?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY 28 (Apr. 2000).
38. William D. Wiese, Death of a Myth: The Patenting of Internet Business Models After
State Street Bank, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 43 (2000). See generally 145 Cong. Rec.
E1651 (2000); 145 Cong. Rec. E1659 (Oct. 4, 2000) (introducing H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2d.
Sess. 2000), which provides for stricter standards for obviousness relating to business method
inventions where novelty is based only on adaptation of the method to a computer or the internet).
39. U.S. Patent No. 5,745,681 (issued Apr. 28, 1998).
40. U.S. Patent No. 5,715,314 (issued Feb. 3, 1998).
41. U.S. Patent No. 5,948,061 (issued Sept. 7, 1999).
42. U.S. Patent No. 5,774,870 (issued June 30, 1998).
43. U.S. Patent No. 5,825,651 (issued Oct. 20, 1998).
44. U.S. Patent No. 5,897,620 (issued Apr. 27, 1999).
45. John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 159, 159-60 (1999).
46. Id. at 160.
47. Id. See also Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
586 (1999).
48. Id. at 579.
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ness process problems and customer needs; invent proprietary new
business method systems that solve those problems, and then unlock
the value of our business systems through licensing of our technolo-
gies . ..We take existing and digital technologies, especially the
internet, and apply them to these new customer solutions.49
Whether a company like Walker Digital would have existed before State
Street is questionable.5" Even conventional companies, however, have
realized the importance of acquiring intellectual property, particularly
patents.5
Because a patent gives the owner or assignee the right to exclude
others from using52 the patented device for twenty years,53 companies
have been able to extract large revenues in the form of license fees, and
can also barter for the use of another company's patented technology
through cross-licensing agreements. 54 In contrast, in the context of busi-
ness method patents, acquisition of patent rights has also become some-
what a defensive strategy. According to Greg Blonder, a longtime
researcher and vice president at Bell Labs, "[A]s to my own business-
process patents, well, as long as everyone in town is carrying a gun, I
have to be armed as well."'56 The phenomenon, which requires Internet
businesses to procure patents or purchase licenses, has been described
by many commentators as a sort of private tax on business that effec-
tively takes away resources from research and development.57 Innova-
tion is therefore stifled where resources are diverted to the patent
problem.
Furthermore, the very nature of software and Internet development
provides for a difficult model for patent protection. 8 Unlike other types
of invention, software and Internet development occur both iteratively
49. See Walker Ditigal, Inc., About Walker Ditigal, at http://www.walkerdigital.com/Our
Company/company-overview. On the Walker Digital website, the quoted material appears in its
Strategy Statement.
50. Merges, supra note 47, at 579.
51. Gleick, supra note 8, at 46.
52. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). This section also prevents others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell any patented invention without authority and prohibits the importation of
any patented invention into the United States.
53. Contents and Term of Patent, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
54. Gleick, supra note 8, at 48. Gleick estimates the revenues in the United States for
licensing alone to be $100 billion. IBM alone has received well over $1 billion in licensing fees
last year.
55. Id. at 49.
56. Id.
57. Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5. See also Gleick, supra
note 8, at 46.
58. Pamela Samuelson, et al., Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm: A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computerprograms, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2331 (1994).
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and sequentially.59 Software development typically is a mixture of old
and new elements and sometimes employs exclusively well-known ele-
ments.6° Software developers rarely create new products in isolation or
from scratch.6' Software and Internet developers build on existing tech-
nology through a highly evolved system of sharing or a borrowing of
ideas.62 Finally, much of this prior art that is borrowed cannot be found
in existing patents or even published. In what Representative Berman
described as "folk knowledge," prior art may be handed from person to
person orally, in chat rooms, or even by e-mail.63 Additionally, a
programmer may acquire knowledge of prior art by working with others
on teams, through exchanges at conferences, or by reading electronic
bulletin boards.64 Many of these sources, however, will not be revealed
through a traditional search of prior art.
Many commentators believe that the existing patent system is an
inappropriate vehicle for protecting software and business method
inventions, while others believe the system could be made more effec-
tive through modifications. 5 This Comment will examine the require-
ments for obtaining a computer-implemented business method patent,
and focus specifically on the most troubling and unsettled area as
applied to computer-implemented business methods: Non-obvi-
ousness. 66  The Comment will demonstrate why Non-obviousness
remains the last real test to determine whether an invention is worthy of
patent protection, and how impotent that standard has become with
regard to computer-implemented business methods. This Comment will
argue that the adoption of a presumption that those skilled in the art of
computer and internet programming are inherently motivated to combine
references will greatly improve the quality of computer-implemented
business method patents.
Part II will discuss the patent systems in general, including the con-
59. Id. at 2345-47. See also Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5.
60. Samuelson, et al., supra note 58, at 2332.
61. John C. Phillips, Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 60
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 997, 1005 (1992).
62. Id. See also Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5.
63. 146 Cong. Rec. E1659 (Oct. 3, 2000) (statement of Rep. Berman). See also John C.
Phillips, supra note 61, at 1005 ("One industry commentator likened this development process to
the 'creation of folk art.').
64. Samuelson, et al., supra note 58, at 2330. There are also many software code exchanges
on the World Wide Web where developers share information by contributing or downloading
modules of software code. See generally Netlib Repository, at http://www.netlib.org.
65. Chad King, Abort, Retry, Fail: Protection for Software-Related Inventions in the Wake of
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1120
(2000).
66. Conditions for patentability, non-obvious subject matter, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp.
V. 1999).
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stitutional basis and statutory requirements for obtaining the patent right.
Part II will demonstrate why obviousness is the most problematic crite-
ria in evaluating computer-implemented business methods. Part III
traces the development of the modem-day obviousness standard, from
its common law beginnings through codification to the present day. Part
IV discusses the Federal Circuit's view on the obviousness standard and
examines potential differences in interpretation between the Supreme
Court's view and the Federal Circuit implementation.
In Part V, the Comment will discuss the examining practices at the
Patent and Trademark Office and, specifically, how applications are
examined in light of the obviousness standard. The motivation of the
Patent Office will be analyzed by examining recent initiatives and fed-
eral funding issues. Part VI will examine the special considerations
applicable to business method patents. Part VI will demonstrate the
problems with the current standards for obviousness used by the Federal
Circuit and Patent and Trademark Office and suggest why very few
applications for business method patents will ultimately be rejected for
obviousness. Additionally, Part VI will examine the arguments regard-
ing why business method patents may be bad for business and innova-
tion, the changes applicable to business method patents made to the
Patent Act by the American Inventor's Act of 1999,67 and the possible
impact of the Business Method Improvements Act bill,68 currently
before Congress.
Part II begins by examining the patent systems in general, including
the constitutional basis and the statutory requirements for obtaining a
patent right.
II. THE PATENT SYSTEM
A patent is a right granted by the federal government to an inven-
tor. Patents sometimes are viewed as a contract between the inventor
and the United States government. Other sources analogize a patent to a
deed, like those used in real estate transactions.69 Similar to a deed, a
patent gives the inventor or his assignee the right to exclude others from
making, selling, or using his invention for a limited period of time.7"
For example, the current term of the right for a utility patent is twenty
years from the effective filing date of the patent application.71 After the
67. American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat.
1536 (1999).
68. H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
69. G. PETER ALBERT, JR., INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 386 (1999).
70. Infringement of patent, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
71. Content and term of patent; provisional rights, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V.
1999).
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term expires, the public is free to use or, in patent parlance, "practice"
the invention.72 Reflective of the balance between granting an exclusive
right and encouraging innovation for the public benefit, a person seeking
a patent must make a full and adequate disclosure of his invention.73
An inventor can also assign his patent to another person or entity,
thereby relinquishing his rights completely.74 While a patent owner or
assignee may grant other parties a license to make or use the invention,
the patent owner or assignee is neither under a duty to license the patent
to others, or even to make use of the invention himself.75 In practice,
however, patent owners and assignees will generally make every effort
to exploit their patent rights. 76 Furthermore, the United States patent
system is unique in that only the inventor may apply for a patent, and the
priority rules award the patent to the first-to-invent, as opposed to the
first-to-file systems used in most other countries. The focus on the
inventor in the United States reflects a desire to reward individuals
according to the level of their contributions, and not their social status.77
A. Constitutional Basis for a Patent System
The United States Patent and Trademark system is rooted in the
United States Constitution itself: Article I, section 8, clause 8 gives
Congress express authority "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 78 This
clause has been interpreted as providing for both a federal patent system
and a federal copyright system.79 Moreover, the clause is unusually spe-
cific, directing Congress to establish an "exclusive Right" for "limited
Times," as well as describing the purpose for such a system:8° "[T]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."8
Conventional interpretations of the patent clause utilize the "bal-
anced sentence" technique, popular among eighteenth century prose
writers.82 Using the balanced sentence scheme, "Science" is logically
72. IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE U.S.
PATENT OFFICE 2 (2d ed. 2000).
73. Id. at 3.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
75. ALBERT, JR., supra note 69, at 386.
76. Id.
77. DONNER, supra note 72, at 4.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
80. See In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82. Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1425-
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related to "Authors" and "Writings," while "the useful Arts" logically
relates to "Inventors" and "Discoveries."83 Thus, while the clause gives
Congress the power to establish a system granting inventors rights to
their discoveries, rights can only be granted for those discoveries that
"promote the Progress of ... the useful Arts."84
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as providing Con-
gress with a grant of power along with a limitation of that power.85 In
Graham v. John Deere, the Court interpreted the purpose of Article I,
section 8, clause 8 as a limitation of Congress in its exercise of the pat-
ent power.86 Congress may not "enlarge the patent monopoly without
regard to the innovation, advancement, or social benefit gained thereby
... Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitu-
tional command must 'promote the Progress ... of the useful Arts."' 87
Consider, for example, the mere substitution of materials. In
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,88 Hotchkiss had obtained a patent for door-
knobs where clay or porcelain was substituted for other conventional
materials, such as metal and wood.89 Hotchkiss brought suit for
infringement against Greenwood. The Supreme Court invalidated the
patent because the mere substitution of one commonly known material
for another lacked "that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention." 90
The patent system is designed to encourage invention by rewarding
inventors with an exclusive right, but the grant of an exclusive right (or
monopoly) must be balanced against the value of the invention or
advancement to the public.9 Where the proposed invention is a simple
substitution of existing and well known materials, the comparatively low
value of the invention to the public is easily discouraged by the weight
of the exclusive right to be granted to the applicant for the patent.
Therefore, by constitutional mandate, Congress cannot create a system
granting patents where there is simply no innovation or advancement.
Similarly, the Deere Court articulated a second important limitation
on the patent power stemming from the purpose of promoting the useful
arts. The Court stated that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of
83. Id. at 1426.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
85. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
89. Id. at 264.
90. Id. at 267.
91. John Deere, 383 U.S. at 10-11.
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patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. 92 For
instance, a party could not today be awarded a patent on an invention
that was fully described in a printed publication in 1999. 93 Were a pat-
ent granted in such a situation, the patentee could prevent the author of
the article from using his own invention, discouraging publication of
new discoveries and inventions for fear of theft. In this scenario, rather
than encouraging innovation and advancement, inventors would be more
inclined to keep their inventions secret, providing no public benefit.
With the constitutional limitations in mind, Congress promulgated
the Patent Act of 1790.94 This act created the Department of State
headed by the Secretary of State, the office of the Secretary of the
Department of War, and the Attorney General. Any two of these indi-
viduals could grant patents for a term of fourteen years to any petitioner
who "invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,... or device,
or any improvement therein not before known or used," provided that
"the invention or discovery was sufficiently useful."95 Nevertheless, the
first patent board confronted difficulty in determining which things were
of sufficient worth to the public, and therefore worthy of a patent, and
which were not.96 Amidst efforts by the first patent board to create spe-
cific criteria for determining what inventions are worthy of a patent,
Thomas Jefferson suggested that the federal judiciary was better suited
to develop a set of standards and conditions for patentability. 97 Con-
gress apparently agreed, and although between 1790 and 1950 the Patent
Act has been modified, amended, or revised more than fifty times, Con-
gress has steered clear of defining a statutory set of requirements other
than the Utility and Novelty tests codified today respectively as 35
U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 102.98
B. Statutory Requirements for a Patent Grant
The Patent Act of 195299 codified the three basic criteria used today
for determining whether an invention can be patented: 35 U.S.C. § 101,
Utility; 35 U.S.C. § 102, Novelty; and 35 U.S.C. § 103, Non-Obvi-
ousness. The first two tests, Utility and Novelty, have not been substan-
92. Id. at 6.
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
94. The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
95. Id.
96. John Deere, 383 U.S. at 9.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Id.
99. The Patent Act of 1952 is codified in Title 35 of the United States Code.
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tially changed from the tests appearing in the Patent Act of 1793.00 The
third test, Non-Obviousness, was originally a judicial doctrine created in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,'' and further developed until it was incorpo-
rated into the Patent Act of 1952. In keeping with Jefferson's contention
that the judiciary was better suited to develop more specific guidelines,
the three basic statutory provisions remain general, and courts have sub-
jected them to varying interpretations.
(1) UTILITY, 35 u.s.c. § 101
The first statutory requirement for obtaining a patent, Utility, is
based largely upon the constitutionally mandated purpose of promoting
the useful arts.10 2 Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code,
entitled "Inventions Patentable," unsurprisingly sets out various catego-
ries of patentable inventions. 103 The text states that "Whoever invents or
discovers a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."' 4 Courts have not had many problems defining the latter three
categories of patentable inventions, but the first category, process, has
proven more difficult to implement in practice.1
0 5
With regards to software, the courts' approach to § 101 seemed to
be dominated by determining whether the invention fit into any of the
latter three categories: machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter.'0 6 A "process" is defined in the Patent Act as a "process, art, or
method and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufac-
ture, composition of matter, or material."'1 7 A software invention, how-
ever, when claimed as a process, can indistinguishable from a
mathematical algorithm.1
0 8
For instance, consider the 1972 United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals case of Gotchalk v. Benson, °9 where Benson attempted
to patent a method of converting binary coded decimal numbers
("BCD") into pure binary format. "0 Here, the process claims were not
100. The Patent Act of 1793, ch. 1I, I Stat. 318 (1790) (repealed 1836).
101. 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1850).
102. Durham, supra note 82, at 1428.
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
104. Id.
105. See Durham, supra note 82, at 1428.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
108. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) ("The line between a patentable 'process' and
an unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear.").
109. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
110. Id. at 65.
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limited to any particular art or technology, or even any particular end
use. In fact, the claims covered any use of the claimed method in a
general purpose digital computer.11 ' The Court observed:
The conversion of BCD numerals to pure binary numbers can be
done mentally through the use of the foregoing table. The method
sought to be patented varies from the ordinary arithmetic steps a
human would use by changing the order of the steps, changing the
symbolism for writing the multiplier use in some steps, and by taking
subtotals after each successive operation. The mathematical proce-
dures can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new
machinery being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be per-
formed without a computer.
12
To issue a patent for this invention would, in effect, pre-empt the
mathematical formula converting BCD numbers to binary numbers," 3
thereby prohibiting others from using the formula without license." 4
Furthermore, in what would become known as the mental step doctrine,
the Benson Court reiterated the long standing principal that
"[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are basic tools
of scientific and technological work."" 5
Six years later, in 1978, the Supreme Court had another opportunity
to examine the patent eligibility question regarding software inventions
in Parker v. Flook."6 Unlike Benson, where the invention was not
directed toward a particular apparatus or end use,' ,' the claims in Flook
operated to adjust alarm limits in a catalytic converter apparatus."
8
Flook argued that his invention did not pre-empt the mathematical
formula because the formula had uses outside the catalytic conversion
process that remain in the public domain.' 19 Additionally, the Flook
claims differed from the invention in Benson in that they contained more
than just the mathematical formula or algorithm; the claims also
described so-called "post-solution" activity, namely the adjustment of
the alarm limit according to the formula.120 Despite these differences
from Benson, the Court held the invention was unpatentable because to
permit a patent to be issued here would allow careful draftsman to patent
111. Id. at 64.
112. Id. at 67.
113. Id. at 72.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
115. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).
116. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
117. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
118. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585.
119. Id. at 590.
120. Id.
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ideas and phenomenon of nature previously prohibited by including
"post solution" activity. 121 The Court held "[t]he rule that the discovery
of a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural
phenomenon are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental
understanding that they are not the kind of discoveries that the statute
was enacted to protect." 122 According to the Flook Court, laws of nature
are not new, but have always existed and thus are not eligible for patent
protection under the Utility Standard in 35 U.S.C. § 101.123 The Court
did not completely foreclose the use of mathematical algorithms or laws
of nature in patentable inventions however. One must now claim inven-
tive application of the mathematical algorithm or law of nature.
124
Flook highlights the problem of attempting to isolate one of the
three basic criteria for the grant of a patent. In Flook, the Court rejects
the claim as unpatentable principally because the "chemical process
involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as are
the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the use of
alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be
recomputed and reajusted ...125 In his dissent, Justice Stewart argues
that the majority's reasoning is based more squarely on Novelty, 35
U.S.C. § 102, and Non-obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103, than on patent
eligibility, 35 U.S.C. § 101.126 In Justice Stewart's view, the question
before the Flook Court was whether a claimed process looses its status
as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because one step of
the process would not be patentable if considered in isolation.'22 While
the majority would seem to agree that the claims must be read as a
whole, 1 8 they characterize the "process as unpatentable under § 101,
not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but
because once than algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention."'
129
If the invention is found within the prior art, i.e. the invention was
already made prior to Flook's discovery, then it would be said to be
anticipated by the prior art, and thus be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102, Novelty.' 30 Although 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes language requir-
ing that the invention be "new and useful," Flook illustrates the diffi-
121. Id. at 593.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 593 n.15.
124. Id. at 594.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 598-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 599.
128. Id. at 594.
129. Id.
130. Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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culty in determining the proper balance between 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35
U.S.C. § 102, a question that would not be answered by the Supreme
Court until 1980 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.'
3'
While Chakrabarty did not involve a software issue, the case estab-
lished the proper weight to be given to 35 U.S.C. § 101 in rejecting an
invention as unpatentable subject matter. In Chakrabarty, the inventor
had created human-made, genetically engineered oil eating bacterium
that would break down multiple components of crude oil. 132 The claims
encompassed a process for producing the bacteria, a method for using
the bacteria, and a claim for the bacteria in and of itself.'33 The patent
examiner rejected the claim for the bacteria based on two arguments:
(1) micro-organisms are "products of nature"; and (2) as living things,
they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.4 In
rejecting these arguments and declaring the claim for the bacteria patent-
able, Chief Justice Burger used a liberal interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101: "In choosing such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and 'com-
position of matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
scope."' 135 Although the Court did not suggest that 35 U.S.C. § 101 has
no limits, the Chakrabarty opinion suggest a much more expansive view
of patentable subject matter and places more emphasis on 35 U.S.C.
§ 102, Novelty, and 35 U.S.C. § 103, Non-obviousness, for inventive
criteria.
In 1981, the Supreme Court finally laid to rest any remaining legal
arguments against the patentability of computer programs. In Diamond
v. Diehr,136 the invention was claimed as a process for curing synthetic
rubber, which included the execution of a mathematical formula via a
digital computer and program software designed to effect a perfect
cure. 137 The patent examiner had rejected the claim on the basis of the
Court's reasoning in Gottchalk v. Benson,138 that the mathematical
algorithm performed on a computer under the control of a stored pro-
gram constituted non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.139
131. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
132. Id. at 305.
133. Id. at 305-06.
134. Id. at 306.
135. Id. at 308. This is Chief Justice Burger's interpretation of the language from 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 which states: "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
136. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
137. Id. at 177.
138. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
139. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 180.
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Diehr differed from Benson, however, in that the Diehr application
claims covered the entire process of curing synthetic rubber, not just the
equation to determine the proper cure time.1 40 In contrast, the Benson
claims covered the equation (or algorithm) used to convert the BCD
numbers to binary numbers, not specifically related to any particular end
result or apparatus. 141 For similar reasons, Diehr is not inconsistent with
Flook. 4 2 There, the inventor sought to claim a method for computing
an alarm limit, i.e. a number, which was basically a mathematical
formula. 
143
The Diehr Court determined the key difference between Benson,
Flook, and Diehr to be whether the patent claims seek to pre-empt the
mathematical formula or algorithm, or whether the claims only seek to
foreclose others from using the equation in conjunction with all the other
steps in their particular process.144 The Diehr application made use of a
well known equation called the Arrhenius equation,'45 but the claims
contained many other required steps encompassing the invention.
146
Recalling Flook and Benson, then-Justice Rehnquist clarified the early
precedents stating, "[o]ur earlier opinions lend support to our present
conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does
not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula,
computer program, or digital computer."' 47 Moreover, in a foreshad-
owing of the bulk of future inventions, Rehnquist continued, "[i]t is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection."' 48 The Court concluded that due to the presence of the
other steps in the claims, Diehr did not seek to pre-empt the use of the
equation, and thus the application covered patentable subject matter. 4 9
Significantly, the Court focused on the fact that the formula in question
was part of an industrial process.'
50
Finally, Diehr also sought to clarify the relevant considerations
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, further eroding Utility as a road block to patent
protection. The Court found that "[s]ection 101 .. .is a general state-
ment of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection
140. Id. at 187.
141. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
142. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
143. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186.
144. Id. at 187.
145. Id. at 177-78.
146. Id. at 181 n.5.
147. Id. at 187.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 187-88.
150. Id. at 193.
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.* ,I Even though the language in that section contains references to
"new and useful," the novelty of the invention, or any step or element of
an invention for that matter, is irrelevant in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim is patentable therein. 5 2 Thus, the Court vali-
dates the view of Justice Stewart's Flook dissent, creating a broad inter-
pretation of what subject matter is patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and
placing greater emphasis on 35 U.S.C. § 102, Novelty, and 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, Non-obviousness, as the gatekeepers to patent protection.
1 53
After Diehr, the courts were left with only a few categories that
constituted non-patentable subject matter: "laws of nature, natural phe-
nomenon, and abstract ideas."' 54 Similarly, the Court held that since
mathematical algorithms are considered abstract ideas, they, by them-
selves, are not patentable subject matter. When reduced to some kind of
practical application that creates a "useful, concrete, and tangible result,"
then mathematical algorithms can be part of the claimed invention.
1 55
There was one additional category not addressed in Diehr, however, that




Although cases involving business methods had existed before
1908, the business method exception seems to have first entered the
jurisprudential lexicon in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.'
57
The invention in Hotel Security Checking was a system of checks and
accounting registers designed to prevent waiters from pocketing both
their tips and the dining charge.' 58 The actual rejection of the patent
may have stemmed more from a novelty problem than from a specific
rejection of business methods. The Court held that "[t]he fundamental
principal of the system is as old as the art of bookkeeping, i.e., charging
the goods of the employer to the agent who takes them."'' 59 The genesis
of the business method exception is found in another part of the Hotel
Security Checking opinion: "A system of transacting business discon-
151. Id. at 189.
152. Id. at 188.
153. Parker v. Rook, 473 U.S. 584, 598 (1978).
154. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
155. In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
156. Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a
Statutory Rejection?, 38 I.D.E.A. 403, 403 (1998).
157. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
158. Id. at 467.
159. Id. at 469. The Non-obviousness standard, 35 U.S.C. § 103, was enacted with the 1952
Patent Act. Although Hotel Security Checking might have been an example of an appropriate
obviousness rejection, that statutory authority did not exist until forty-four years later.
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nected from the means for carrying out the system is not within the most
liberal interpretation of the term, [patentable subject matter]. ' 16° But
until 1998, judges, lawyers, and commentators were divided on the exis-
tence of the business method exception.
For instance, in his article "Useful Arts" in the Information Age,
Professor Alan Durham takes the position that there is no constitutional
basis for the grant of a patent for a business method: "There is no corre-
sponding evidence that the Framers intended to encourage developments
in business methods, political strategies, pedagogical techniques, or sim-
ilar undertakings... If the Framers had entertained such unconventional
thoughts ...one might expect some explicit statement to that effect
either in the Constitution or in the early patent acts." '161 The concept of
a business method exception as invalid was so pervasive, that until 1996,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office's Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure included Rule 706.03: "Though seemingly within
the category of process or method, a method of doing business can be
rejected as not being within the statutory classes."'
162
In contrast, in his recent article on the business method exception,
Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, states that "the business method exception is of
dubious analytical value. Nearly every case that supposedly invoked
this rule simply restated the longstanding proposition that naked ideas,
bereft of anything physically inventive, are not patentable."1 63 Further-
more, additional criticism came from Federal Circuit Court Judge New-
man in her dissent in the case of In re Schrader.164  "I discern no
purpose in perpetuating a poorly defined, redundant, and unnecessary
'business methods' exception, indeed enlarging (and enhancing the fuzz-
iness of) that exception by applying it in this case. All of the 'doing
business' cases could have been decided using the clearer concepts of
Title 35. ' ' 16s Judge Newman also remarked that the court in Hotel
Security Checking discussed the "'obviousness' of the system of records
... at considerably greater length than whether the subject matter was
160. Id. The modified position of the Hotel Security Checking quote cited here originally
ended with "an art." Hotel Security Checking Co., 160 F. at 469. However, this case was decided
when the precursor to 35 U.S.C. § 101, section 4886 read "any person who has invented or
discovered any new or useful art, machine..." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 203, § 24, 16 Stat. 201.
That section was modified by the Patent Act of 1952 to read "Whoever invents or discovers any
new or useful process ..." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Here, the Second Circuit was referring to
"art" as it appeared in the section on patentable subject matter.
161. Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1455.
162. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, Rule
706.03(a) (Aug. 1993).
163. Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, supra note 143, at 404.
164. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
165. Id. at 298.
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'statutory' ."166
Finally, in 1998, the Federal Circuit joined Judge Newman's view
and denounced the existence of an exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101 for
business methods. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finan-
cial Services Group, Inc., the District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts had invalidated a patent assigned to Signature because, "as
established by a series of older cases, business methods are unpatentable
abstract ideas."' 67 In State Street Bank, Signature's patent covered a
data processing system and method for administering a partnership port-
folio and partner fund financial services configuration, a Hub and Spoke
system, where the Spokes (funds) are invested in a Hub (portfolio).'68
The system determines the share that each fund has in the total portfolio
and allocates the daily income, expenses, and loss to each fund. 169 In
reversing the district courts decision invalidating the patent, the Federal
Circuit made a special effort to "lay this ill-conceived [business method]
exception to rest."'
70
Interestingly, the court suggested that the exception was an applica-
tion of the "requirement of invention" principal that had been super-
seded by the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 103, Non-obviousness, in the
Patent Act of 1952.11 The court found that "[t]he business method
exception had never been invoked in a determination of
unpatentability."' 7 2 Similarly, the court noted that the USPTO has
removed the rule on business method exceptions, Rule 706.03(a), from
the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure in 1996.' 7 ' Furthermore,
the 1996 Patent and Trademark Examination Guidelines for Computer
Related Inventions 74 instructed examiners against categorizing inven-
tions as "methods of doing business." The guidelines stated "Claims
should not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead, such
claims should be treated like any other process claims."'' 7 ' The business
method exception, which once posed a high hurdle for software develop-
ers, had been completely vitiated by State Street.
166. Id.
167. State St. Bank & Trust, Co. v. Signature Fin. Serv. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D.
Mass. 1996), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
168. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued Mar. 9, 1993).
169. Id.
170. State St. Bank & Trust, Co. v. Signature Fin. Serv. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1377.
173. Id.
174. 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996).
175. Id.
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(3) NOVELTY, 35 u.s.c. § 102
The second statutory requirement for an invention to be patentable
is Novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102. 76 Novelty is more specific than Utility or
Non-obviousness in that it provides an enumeration of situations where a
patent may not be obtained for an invention. 177 The enumerated situa-
tions are generally separated into three categories: statutory bar, prior
invention, and miscellaneous. The statutory bar sections, § 102(b)
1 78
and § 102(d), 79 deal with situations where the invention to be patented
has been on sale, published, or in public use for more than one year prior
to the date of filing of the patent application.' 8 ° The prior invention
categories, sections § 102(a),181 § 102(e), 82 and § 102(g),18 3 describe
situations where the item to be patented has been invented by someone
else, published, used, or placed on sale before the patent has applicant
conceived of the invention. 8 4 The third category is a miscellaneous cat-
egory that includes all the residual subsections of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that
do not fit into the first two categories. For example, § 102(f) 8 5 prevents
a person from obtaining a patent if he did not, in fact, invent the subject
matter described in the application. 8 6 A person is barred from obtaining
a patent under § 102(c) for an invention he has abandoned. 8 7 The cen-
tral theme unifying all three categories is a limitation of the grant of a
patent to those inventions that are indeed novel, or new.1
88
The Novelty requirement has special application in the United
States patent system, which is predicated on a first-to-invent concept, as
opposed to a first-to-file system. 189 In a first-to-file system, which pre-
dominates in most other countries, patents are awarded to the first indi-
vidual (or in some cases first entity) to file an application for a patent. 90
In contrast, in a first-to-invent system, a patent can only be obtained by
the individual who first invents a process, machine, manufacture, com-
176. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
177. See id. "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless. Id. (emphasis added).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
179. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (1994).
180. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (d) (1994). See also David E. Wigley, Evolution of the
Concept of Non-Obviousness of the Novel Invention: From a Flash of Genius to the Trilogy, 42
ARiZ. L. REV. 581, 586 (2000).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
182. 35 U.S.C. §102(e) (1994).
183. 35 U.S.C. §102(f) (1994).
184. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (g), (h) (1994). See also Wigley, supra note 180.
185. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1994).
186. Id.
187. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (c) (1994).
188. Wigley, supra note 180, at 585.
189. Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491 (D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17, 971).
190. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIAL ON PATENT LAW 204 (1998).
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position of matter, or improvement thereof.191 In the United States' sys-
tem, where order of filing is not determinative of patent award,
ascertaining that the applicant is, in fact, the first inventor is a primary
consideration and has generated much litigation notwithstanding the
rather objective statutory criteria for Novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102.192
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) states the general first-to-invent rule used in the
United States: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the
invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent ... For example, if an
inventor filed an application for a patent describing a new microproces-
sor but the same microprocessor had appeared in a thesis or journal arti-
cle prior to the date of invention listed by the applicant, then the
applicant could not obtain a patent. 94 This is because the invention
claim is said to have been anticipated by the thesis or journal article,
known in the vernacular as a reference. Similarly, if the same
microprocessor had been sold commercially, or publically used before
the applicant's date of invention, then the applicant's claims to the
microprocessor would also be anticipated; thus, a patent could not be
obtained. 95 A more difficult situation, however, arises where the
microprocessor the applicant has claimed is not exactly the same as the
microprocessor described in the reference or currently in public use.
The standard for anticipation has two requirements: (1) that the
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter used in public
or described in the publication be the same as the claimed invention; and
(2) that it be described by a single reference.' 96 "Anticipation under 35
U.S.C. § 102 requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of
each and every element of the claimed invention."1 97 For example, if
the microprocessor described in the patent application claimed two reg-
isters for making a particular floating point computation, but the
microprocessor described in the journal article contained only one such
register, then the invention in the application would not necessarily be
anticipated by the journal article reference. This is not "anticipation"
under § 102 because the reference is missing the additional register for
making this particular computation. The reference can still anticipate
the invention claimed in the application, however, if the addition of the
191. Id.
192. Wigley, supra note 180, at 585.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
194. See generally In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
195. See generally Gilman v. Stem, 114 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1940).
196. Lewmar Marine Inc. v. Barient Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
197. Id.
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second register is a minor aspect, or not essential to the Novelty of the
invention.1 98 This might occur where the second register is only a con-
tinuation of the first. In contrast, anticipation would not likely be found
where the additional register was an integral part of the invention, such
as producing a more efficient computation.
The reason for building some flexibility into the anticipation stan-
dard to reach references that do not expressly disclose minor aspects of a
claimed invention is two-fold. First, if only minor changes to non-
essential parts of an invention disclosed in a prior art reference would
save an application from anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, then clever
drafting could eviscerate the anticipation standard altogether.1 99 "If
exact identity were required, § 102(b) would become a paper defense,
for then what is earlier put in use with minor changes later could be
patented . . . 200 Second, where a reference fails to disclose a minor
aspect of the claimed invention, some flexibility must be built into the
anticipation standard to account for situations "where the common
knowledge of technologists is not recorded in the reference; that is
where, the technological facts are known to those in the field of the
invention, albeit not known to judges."' 2 1 The latter rationale underlies
the concept of "inherency," where some aspect, not recited in the refer-
ence, is inherent to the technology, or process.20 2 For example, in Conti-
nental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co.,2°3 the invention was a design for
making the bottom of plastic bottles stronger by including hollow, rib-
like structures. 2 4 Prior art had been identified where the bottom struc-
ture of the plastic bottle was characterized by ribs that appeared solid.2 °5
Some molding processes produce such a structure as hollow parts, how-
ever, a fact commonly known to practitioners of the plastic molding
arts.20 6 If the molding process used to produce the prior art bottle con-
sistently produced hollow ribs, then the patented invention would be
anticipated. 2 7 Furthermore, the inherency doctrine is very narrow in
application and can only be used in limited circumstances, where the
inherent characteristic can be established beyond only possibilities and
probabilities, a fact that cannot be established at the summary judgment
198. IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE U.S.
PATENT OFFICE 462 (2d ed. 1999).
199. Dix-Seal Corp. v. New Haven Trap Rock Co., 236 F. Supp. 914, 919 (D. Conn. 1964).
200. Id.
201. Cont'l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
202. DONNER, supra note 198, at 462.
203. 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
204. Id. at 1266.
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phase of litigation.2 °s
The distinction between a reference containing each and every ele-
ment of the claimed invention, and one containing similar or equivalent
elements has widened in the twentieth century. 20 9 Prior to the Patent
Act of 1952, the term anticipation (as it relates to Novelty) was given a
much broader meaning: "The pre-1952 cases often used the term 'antic-
ipation' to mean that the subject matter of the claims either was found
exactly in prior art (i.e. lacked Novelty) or, though different, was not
'inventive' over the prior art."'210 This latter category was codified in
the Patent Act of 1952 as the Non-obvious subject matter standard, 35
U.S.C. § 103.21 Although post-1952 cases still cling to the old interpre-
tation of "anticipation," prior art that contains similar, but not the same,
elements as those claimed in the application for a patent "is more akin to
obviousness. 1 2 Thus, the anticipation aspect of Novelty is becoming a
narrower exception to patentability, putting further emphasis on the
Non-obviousness subject matter test of 35 U.S.C. § 103.
(4) NON-OBVIOUS SUBJECT MATTER, 35 U.S.C. § 103
The third basic condition for patentability is the Non-obviousness
requirement codified as 35 U.S.C. § 103:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which the said subject matter pertains.21 3
The Non-obviousness standard prevents patents from issuing on inven-
tions that contain insignificant differences over prior art.2 4 As a result
of the congressional determination that trivial advances should not be
awarded patent protection, the Non-obviousness standard ensures that a
patent "may issue only for those literally new solutions that are beyond
the grasp of the ordinary artisan who has full understanding of the perti-
nent art. 2t 5
Where Novelty leaves off, Non-obviousness continues. Recall that
208. Id. at 1269.
209. Lewmar Marine Inc. v. Barient Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 748.
213. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
214. IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE U.S.
PATENT OFFICE 498 (2d ed. 2000).
215. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.01 (2001).
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to be rejected for lack of Novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the invention
must be substantially identical to that described by a prior art refer-
ence. 2 16 Under an obviousness analysis, however, even if the invention
is not identical to that disclosed in the prior art, it still may be rejected
for obviousness if the difference or modification "would have been obvi-
ous . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art."'2 17 For
example, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,2t 8 the patent application claimed a
doorknob with the same design as previous doorknobs, but composed of
clay or porcelain, instead of wood or metal.21 9 Although the substitution
of clay or porcelain was novel, the Hotchkiss Court found that the sub-
stitution was obvious:
[F]or unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it
to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of
every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of a
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor. 2
Furthermore, where Novelty requires that all the elements of a
claimed invention be present in a single prior art reference, in some cir-
cumstances elements from two or more references can be combined
under an obviousness analysis. In the case of In re Oetiker,2 Oetiker's
claimed invention, a hose clamp, was rejected by the patent examiner in
light of two references: (1) a patent by Lauro; and (2) a patent previ-
ously filed by Oetiker himself. Oetiker's invention was in essence, a
mere improvement over his previously filed patent in that it differed by
the presence of a hook designed to disengage automatically when the
clamp is tightened, while the Lauro reference disclosed a hook and eye
fastener used in garments. 2 The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the
rejection because the references were improperly combined, holding
"[t]here must be some reason, suggestion or motivation found in the
prior art whereby a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention
would make the combination.2 2 3 Intriguingly, the court reversed the
rejection notwithstanding the examiner's apparent belief that a practi-
tioner in the art of hose clamps would naturally look to the garment
216. Wigley, supra note 180, at 588.
217. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
218. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
219. Id. at 264.
220. Id. at 267.
221. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
222. Id. at 1446.
223. Id. at 1447.
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industry for hook solutions.224
The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed with the Board's position
that all hooking problems are analogous. 225 Judge Newman explained
the rationale: "The combination of elements from non-analogous
sources, in a manner that reconstructs the applicant's invention only
with the benefit of hindsight, is insufficient to present a prima facie case
of obviousness. 226 Because patent examination is conducted by hind-
sight, where the invention is necessarily made known to the examiner
and the court, the examination process must be protected from the ten-
dency to search the prior art for items that upon examination seem obvi-
ous. 2 2 7 Therefore, courts confine the combination of references to those
situations where the references themselves suggest or teach the combi-
nation. Similarly, the references must come from areas of analogous art,
for example, in fields where a person of ordinary skill in the art would
reasonably be expected to look for a solution.22 8
The In re Oetiker example also highlights another important differ-
ence between Novelty and Non-obviousness. Under the Non-obvi-
ousness analysis, the prior art must be from an analogous field in order
to limit the prejudicial effect of hindsight,229 whereas prior art under
Novelty analysis contains no such constraints, as prior art for purposes
of'Novelty can come from any field.2 3 ° In her concurring opinion in the
case of In re Oetiker, however, Chief Judge Nies cautioned against tak-
ing an overly restrictive view of the combination of references under
Non-obviousness.231 The Chief Judge suggested that the court reflect
the concept of suggestion or motivation to combine references in terms
of "from the prior art" rather than "in the prior art."' 23 2 In her view, the
particular reference relied upon need not specifically contain an express
suggestion to combine; rather, the suggestion or motivation to combine
two or more references can be derived from the general knowledge of
those persons of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
2 3 3
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS
Unlike Utility and Novelty, Non-obviousness was not part of the
224. Id. at 1446.
225. Id.




230. DONNER, supra note 214, at 459.
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Patent Act of 1790, nor would it become codified until the Patent Act of
1952.234 Instead, from 1850 to 1952, the courts employed standards
such as "level or standard of invention. 235 This judicially created stan-
dard was first described in the 1850 case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
where the Supreme Court held that an invention must be more than
novel to satisfy the conditions for patentability. 6 The Hotchkiss Court
ruled a patent for a new product could only be obtained if the level of
skill required was no more than that of a skilled mechanic.2 37 The "level
of invention test" was followed by most courts, however, it proved to be
difficult to apply in practice. As a result, many courts began promulgat-
ing "negative rules." '238 These judicially created "negative rules" were
for the most part, attempts by the courts to define levels of invention that
did not meet the standard required to obtain a patent.2 39
While many court developed these negative tests of inventions,
others tried to establish objective standards, albeit with somewhat lim-
ited success.24 ° For example, in Cuno Engineering v. Automatic Devices
Corp.,24" ' the point of novelty in the invention was the addition of a
thermostat to break a circuit in a automotive cigarette lighter.242 The
Court, in an attempt to follow Hotchkiss, found the patent invalid, rea-
soning that "the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the
flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling." '243 The
invention in this case, according to the Court, was analogous to the use
of thermostats in toasters, heaters, and irons."' Furthermore, the devel-
opment of the wireless automotive lighter had seen several iterations of
patented designs, indicating possibly a crowded field or a lack of a
"flash of creative genius."245
The Court in Graham v. John Deere2 46 noted that the phrase "flash
of creative genius" did not actually create a more exacting standard, but
merely rhetorically restated that the invention must require something
beyond the skill of the calling.247 Seemingly in response to Cuno Engi-
neering, Congress enacted the second sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),
234. ADELMAN, ET. AL. supra note 190, at 409.
235. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.02 (2001).
236. Wigley, supra note 180, at 588.
237. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
238. Wigley, supra note 180, at 588.
239. CHISUM, supra note 235, at § 5.02.
240. Wigley, supra note 180, at 589.
241. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).




246. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
247. Id. at 15 n.7.
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which states "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made." '248 The Reviser's Note to that section
seems to indicate that the intent of the second sentence was to render
immaterial the question of whether the invention resulted from a long
period of experimentation or from a flash of genius.24 9
The negative rules of invention came to dominate the judicial stan-
dards through the 1950 case of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equipment.2 5 0 The claimed invention consisted of a cash-
ier's counter equipped with a rack to push or pull groceries or other
items to the checking clerk.251 The district court determined that the
conception of the counter with the rack considered as a whole, was new
and useful although each element of the claimed device had been found
in the prior art.25 2 Invalidating the patent, Justice Jackson, writing for
the Supreme Court, explained that an aggregation of old elements must
create something greater than the sum of the parts.253 The Court
explained that "The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or ele-
ments which, in the aggregation, perform or produce no new or different
function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by
them, is not patentable invention. 254 Some commentators suggest this
was a miscalculation of how science and technology create novel inven-
tions. Nonetheless, the so-called "synergism test" effectively added
another category to the list of inventions that did not rise to the level of
invention: the mere aggregation of old elements.2 55
The synergism test drew criticism from Second Circuit Judge
Learned Hand. Judge Hand recognized that practically all inventions are
a combination of old elements. He stated that "It is idle to say that
combinations of old elements cannot be inventions; substantially every
invention is for such a 'combination': That is to say, it consists of for-
mer elements in a new assemblage. 2 56 In the interim, between Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. and Judge Hand's comments in Reiner v. L
Leon Co.,257 Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952. Among other
things, the Patent Act of 1952 codified the judicially created Non-obvi-
248. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
249. Graham, 383 U.S. at 16 n.8.
250. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
251. Id. at 149.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 152.
254. Id. at 151 (quoting Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549
(1938)).
255. Wigley, supra note 180, at 590.
256. Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
257. Id.
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ousness standard at 35 U.S.C. § 103.258 The legislative history behind
§ 103 reveals Congress's intent to "stabilize" the protection of inven-
tions and to ensure "uniformity and definiteness" with respect to patent
law .2 9 Both the Senate and House reports indicate that § 103 was a
major change to Title 35, while other portions of the report indicate that
it was merely a codification of existing, judicially developed criteria.261
Judge Learned Hand believed that the effect of the Patent Act of
1952 was to restore the definition of obviousness announced in Hotch-
kiss v. Greenwood.26' In response, Judge Hand reiterated that the objec-
tive standard applied to inventions that are combinations of old
elements: "All the constituents may be old, if their new concourse
would not 'have been obvious ... to a person having ordinary skill in
the art.' ",262 Furthermore, in Reiner and an earlier case, Lyon v. Bausch
& Lomb,2 63 Judge Hand may have planted the seeds of the more objec-
tive criteria that would get the Supreme Court's approval in the 1966
case of Graham v. John Deere.26
Lyon involved a coating used on glass lenses.265 In determining
that the invention was not obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art,
Judge Hand considered other objective criteria as indicative of Non-
obviousness:
The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years
been seeking a hearty, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there
had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing
in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into
operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and
occupied substantially the whole field.2 66
Similarly, in Reiner, Judge Hand used similar indicia for the Second
Circuit's analysis of Non-obviousness. In describing the difficulty a
judge has in determining what is obvious to one skilled in the art, Judge
Hand found some solace in the objective criteria: "There are indeed
some sign posts: e.g. how long did the need exist; how many tried to
find the way; how long did the surrounding and accessory arts disclose
the means; how immediately was the invention recognized as an answer
by those who used the variafit?" 267 Therefore, in the Second Circuit, to
258. CHISUM, supra note 235, at § 5.02[4].
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
262. Id.
263. Lyon v. Bauch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
264. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
265. Lyon, 224 F.2d at 530.
266. Id. at 535.
267. Reiner, 285 F.2d at 504.
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demonstrate that an invention was Non-obvious, an inventor could use
extrinsic evidence such as a long felt need, failure by others to find a
solution, or rapid adoption of the new invention by the market.
The Second, Third, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits had
adopted Judge Hand's interpretation of the Non-obviousness standard as
codified by the Patent Act of 1952. Conversely, the First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits took the position that the statute was merely a
codification of existing case law at the time, which included Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.'s proscription of combination patents.*68
This division of authority on the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 103 led
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on not one, but three cases con-
cerning Non-obviousness after a fifteen year absence from review of the
subject.2 69 In a series known to practitioners as "the trilogy," the
Supreme Court heard the cases of Graham v. John Deere,27° Calamar v.
Cook Chemical Co.,27 1 and United States v. Adams27 2 to answer the fol-
lowing questions: "[(1) W]hat effect the 1952 Act had upon traditional
statutory and judicial tests of patentability[;] and [(2) W]hat definitive
tests are now required. ' 273 Graham involved an improvement to shank
plows that was essentially a combination of old elements that the Eighth
Circuit rejected because, in a flashback to the rationale of Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., the combination produced no new result. 274 On the
other hand, in Calamar v. Cook Chemical Co., where the invention
related to a plastic sprayer combined with a lid that held the sprayer in a
position suitable for transport,275 the Eighth Circuit found the combina-
tion patent non-obvious in light of the evidence that the invention "ful-
filled a long felt need with an economical, efficient, utilitarian apparatus
which achieved novel results and immediate commercial success. 2 7 6
Underscoring the need for Supreme Court review, not only were con-
flicting opinions being generated by different circuits, but here the Court
confronted conflicting opinions exclusively within the Eighth Circuit.
Although recognizing that the validity of the two patents would
turn on facts of each case, the Supreme Court articulated a general
268. CHISUM, supra note 235, at 5-34.
269. Graham, 383 U.S. at 3.
270. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
271. Calamar v. Cook Chemical Corp., 336 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1964), was consolidated with
Graham v. John Deere.
272. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
273. Graham, 383 U.S. at 4.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 26-27.
276. Calmar v. Cook Chemical Corp., 336 F.2d 110, 114 (8th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 383 U.S. 1
(1966).
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approach to Non-obviousness.277 Ultimately invalidating both the Gra-
ham and Cook Chemical Co. patents, the Court offered guidelines for
Non-obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be deter-
mined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or non-obvi-
ousness of the subject matter is determined. 7 8
While the circuits that followed Judge Hand's view generally believed
that the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 103 was intended to relax the stan-
dards required to obtain a patent,279 the Court specifically rejected this
position stating:
We find no change in the general strictness with which the overall
test is to be applied. We have been urged to find in § 103 a relaxed
standard, supposedly a congressional reaction to the "increased stan-
dard" applied by this Court over the past 20 or 30 years. The stan-
dard has remained invariable in this Court.28°
The Court further suggested that the appearance of a stricter stan-
dard was a result of the rapid advance of technology, causing particular
fields of science to become more crowded with inventions.28' Thus,
under the existing Non-obviousness standards, more prior art exists in
each particular field, making patenting a non-obvious invention more
difficult, while the actual standard has remained substantially the
same. 282
Accordingly, the Graham Court also addressed the use of objective
indicia such as those used by Judge Hand in Reiner and Lyon.283 The
Court held that "Such secondary considerations as commercial success,
long felt but unresolved needs, failure of others, etc. might be utilized to
give light to the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of
Obviousness or Non-obviousness, these inquires have relevancy. 2 84
Furthermore, the Court commented that use of the secondary considera-
tion will aid the judiciary in determination of the primarily technological
inquiry into obviousness, and therefore guard against the use of hind-
sight to incorrectly find obviousness.2 85 Therefore, the use of the secon-
dary consideration is not intended to be ultimately dispositive, but is
277. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
278. Id.
279. CHISUM, supra note 235, at 5-13.
280. Graham, 383 U.S. at 19.
281. Id. at 18.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 17-18.
284. id.
285. Id. at 36.
[Vol. 56:727
OBVIOUSNESS WITH BUSINESS METHODS
merely designed to serve as a guide, or thumbnail check, to indicate
whether an invention is potentially non-obvious.286
In contrast, the companion case of United States v. Adams appears
to have turned on the consideration of secondary criteria.287 Adams's
patent described a non-rechargeable battery comprised of two elec-
trodes, one made of magnesium, the other of cuprous chloride, sub-
merged in an aqueous electrolyte solution.288 Although each of the
elements of the Adams battery could be found in the prior art, their com-
bination was deemed to be non-obvious by one skilled in the art, since
the inventor had to ignore known deficiencies in existing battery tech-
nology, and combine these components notwithstanding the industry
teaching against such a combination.289 The three other factors that
weighed heavily in the Court's opinion were: (1) the disbelief of experts
in the field that the Adams's battery could achieve such results; (2) the
patent office's finding of only one reference to cite against Adams's
application, despite the crowded nature of the field of battery invention;
and (3) the unexpected results that far surpassed then existing wet-bat-
teries.29° The first two factors are analogous to the Graham's secondary
considerations; the third factor, however, where the combination of ele-
ments produced an unexpectedly better result, appears to be closer to the
synergism standard developed in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
Only a short time later, in 1969, the Supreme Court had another
opportunity to test the Non-obviousness standard in Anderson's Black
Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co. 291 In Anderson's Black Rock, the inven-
tion solved a problem inherent in the application of blacktop or
asphalt.292 Asphalt is poured in layers, where one layer is applied on top
of a lower layer. Frequently the lower layer become cool before the
upper layer is deposited, resulting in an inferior, cold joint. The inven-
tion combined older elements on the same chasis to heat the lower layer
before deposition of the next layer: a radiant heat source with a spreader
and a tamper and screed, all on the same chasis.29 3 Citing Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., the Court invalidated the patent because the combi-
nation of known elements, while filling a long felt need and attaining
commercial success, did not produce "an effect greater than the sum of
286. See generally Newell Co. v. Kinney MFG. Co., 864 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating
that the secondary considerations of Graham v. John Deere, while meriting consideration, do not
control the obviousness conclusion.)
287. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1966).
288. Id. at 42.
289. Id. at 52.
290. Id. at 51-52.
291. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
292. Id. at 57.
293. Id. 57-58
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the several effects taken separately. 294 In what appears to be a com-
plete return to Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.'s synergism test, the
Court mentions Graham only to support the position that the Patent Act
of 1952 did not change the general level of patentable invention and that
a"'strict observance' of those requirements is necessary. 295 Commen-
tators have noted that the Anderson's Black Rock opinion dismissed fac-
tual secondary considerations that indicated Non-obviousness, making a
departure from the Graham analysis.296
Furthermore, in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,29 7 the Court used similar
reasoning to invalidate a patent on the ground of obviousness. The pat-
ent described a specially constructed dairy barn that employed water
stored in tanks or pools to remove waste from the barn by flushing the
water over sloped floors.298 The only point of novelty over prior art was
the immediate and abrupt release of sheets of water, as opposed to the
release water through hoses. Citing Anderson's Black Rock, the Court
found the invention unpatentable because it could not be "characterized
as synergistic, that is, resulting in an effect greater than the sum of the
several effects taken separately. 2 99 Both Anderson's Black Rock, and
Sakraida have attracted considerably less citation than the trilogy, and
have largely been seen as a disappointing resurrection of the synergism
requirement.
300
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND ITS VIEW OF OBVIOUSNESS
In the wake of the Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida decisions,
the circuits remained split on the interpretation of § 103 as a result of the
Supreme Court's mutually incompatible rules set out in Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., Anderson's Black Rock, Sakraida, and the trilogy.30'
Some of the most consistent rulings were produced by courts using the
Graham analysis, including the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
while a few regional courts attempted to use the other Supreme Court
cases, resulting in highly unpredictable results.30 2 Predictability, how-
ever, was soon to return to this area, as in 1982 the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit was created to hear all patent appeals, regardless of
whether the case originated in the USPTO or any of the district
294. Id. at 61.
295. Id. at 62.
296. CtusuM, supra note 235, at § 5.02 [4].
297. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
298. Id. at 275-77.
299. Id. at 282.
300. ADELMAN, ET. AL., supra note 190, at 445.
301. Wigley, supra note 180, at 597.
302. Id.
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courts.30 3 Furthering the promise of uniformity, the Federal Circuit
quickly adopted the decisions of the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals
as binding precedent.3 °4
One year later, the Federal Circuit clarified its position regarding
Non-obviousness. In Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corporation, the court
stated that the standard used in the Federal Circuit is that found in Gra-
ham v. John Deere.3 °5 The Federal Circuit panel also further distanced
itself from the Supreme Court approaches in Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., Anderson's Black Rock and Sakraida: "A requirement for
'synergism' or a 'synergistic effect' is nowhere found in the statute ...
synergism may point toward non-obviousness, but its absence has no
place is evaluating evidence of obviousness. 3 °6
A. Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Cases
Although the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Federal Cir-
cuit cases, many commentators have noted the willingness of the Federal
Circuit to depart from Supreme Court precedent. Non-obviousness is an
important example of this divergence. 3°7 Because the Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, there is no opportunity for
a split in the circuits. Coupled with the inherently technical nature of the
issues involved in patent cases, the Supreme Court rarely grants review
of Federal Circuit decisions. 3 8 The Federal Circuit will often distin-
guish or even completely ignore Supreme Court precedent, even if it
appears completely on point.30 9 For all practical purposes, the Federal
Circuit effectively serves as the final arbiter of patent cases.3 t0
B. Differing Standards of Review
In recent years, proving that a patent is obvious in the Federal Cir-
cuit has become extremely difficult.3 1' First, although obviousness is a
303. Id. at 598.
304. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
305. See generally Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See
also Wigley, supra note 180, at 598; Allen P. Klein, A Funny Thing Happened to the Non-obvious
Subject Matter Condition for Patentability on Its Way to the Federal Circuit, 6 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 19 (1997).
306. Stratoflex, Inc., 713 F.2d at 1540.
307. Chad King, Abort, Retry, Fail: Protection for Software Related Inventions in the Wake of
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1124
(2000). See also Klein, supra note 305, at 25.
308. King, supra note 307, at 1124.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Richard H. Stem, Scope of Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods
of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105 (1999).
20021
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
question of law based on underlying factual determinations, 12 the stan-
dard of review varies depending upon whether the case has been
appealed from a district court or the USPTO.31 3 If the appeal originates
from a district court, then the clearly erroneous standard is applicable to
the factual determinations.31 4 If the appeal originates from a USPTO
decision, however, the court must apply the "arbitrary, capricious or
abuse of discretion" standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure
Act 315 (APA), giving greater deference to the USPTO's factual find-
ings.31 6 Both of these standards present a high hurdle for a potential
infringer to meet in a defense based on obviousness of the patented
invention.
C. Combining Prior Art References
Where no one single reference contains all the elements of the
claimed invention, the Federal Circuit requires that the patent examiner
or alleged infringer show a teaching or a motivation to combine refer-
ences that produce the obviousness issue.317 If a particular invention
comprises a programming of a general purpose digital computer to per-
form some business task, the obviousness issue is compounded two dif-
ferent areas of technology: (1) digital computer programming; and (2)
business methods. This requires a combination of references. Further-
more, "[a]ssertions of technical facts in areas of esoteric technology
must always be supported by citation to some reference work recognized
as standard in the pertinent art. ' '31 8 But when dealing with a brand new
area of technology, it is the practitioners of that area who are likely to
have knowledge of science and techniques that are not yet written down
in a "reference work recognized as standard. 31 9
Consider, for example, In re Zurko,32 ° where the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences denied an application for patent describing an
invention for a method of improving security in a computer system on
the basis of obviousness. 321 The claimed method involved processing a
312. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Manuf. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
313. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999).
314. Id.
315. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
316. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 153.
317. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d
994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
318. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 917 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
319. John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 159, 166 (1999).
320. 111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997), rehearing en banc on other grounds, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, sub nor, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 153 (1999).
321. In re Zurko, 11I F.3d at 888-90.
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so-called "trusted" or secure command from an untrusted environ-
ment.3 2 Upon receiving a command from an untrusted computing envi-
ronment, the trusted computing environment would then send the
command back through a trusted pathway to the user for verification.
32 3
If verified by the user over the trusted path, the computer in the trusted
computing environment would then execute the command.32 4 This
allowed the untrusted computer environment to co-exist and operate
with the trusted computing environment. However, the Board rejected
the claim as obvious in light of two references.325 The primary refer-
ence was the UNIX operating system, a secure or trusted computing
environment, that is unable to run some untrusted programs securely.3 26
The second reference was a program known as FILER2, which repeats
potentially dangerous commands back to the user for confirmation.
327
The Board found that while neither UNIX nor FILER2 explicitly suggest
combination of untrusted commands with a user confirmation over a
trusted path to obtain a trusted command, "one of skill in the art wanting
to create a secure system would know to seek verification of a command
over a trusted path because untrusted paths by definition are not
secure."
32 8
Echoing the policy behind requiring that the prior art references
teach or suggest combination, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board on
the basis that their analysis was impermissible hindsight.329 While "it
might seem logical to perform a repeat-back in the UNIX system over a
trusted line, neither UNIX nor FILER2 teaches communicating with the
user over a trusted pathway. '33' Despite the fact that the Board felt that
although the references did not explicitly teach sending a repeat-back via
a trusted path, the combination sought to be patented was inherent or
implicit because it "is basic knowledge that communication in trusted
environments is performed over trusted paths. ' 331 Although the instincts
of the examiners may have been correct, the Federal Circuit refused to
find the invention obvious because the USPTO failed to provide suffi-
ciently detailed documentation of prior art.
332
Similarly, in American Imaging Services, Inc. v. Intergraph






328. Id. at 889.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 888.
332. Kasdan, supra note 319, at 173.
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Corp.,3 33 the Federal Circuit again demonstrated that "suggestion or
motivation" must come from a reference.334 In this case the invention
related to a Computer Aided Design system whose novel feature was the
ability to scan and modify documents.335 The district court found the
claims obvious in light of a reference to SuperPaint, a drawing program
designed for the Apple line of computers that can both scan and modify
documents.336 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
most of the claims were obvious, but overturned the obviousness ruling
on a group of claims specifically directed toward the DOS operating
system.3 37 Despite testimony by William Snider, the developer of
SuperPaint, that SuperPaint could be configured to run on a DOS sys-
tem, the Federal Circuit stated, "absent a teaching, suggestion, or moti-
vation that one of ordinary art would reconfigure SuperPaint for use in
[a DOS system] this conclusion of obviousness is erroneous. '"338 The
Federal Circuit rationalized that William Snider's testimony on whether
the claims indicating use of the invention in the DOS operating system
were obvious in light of the SuperPaint reference was insufficient
because "he was not versed in DOS operating systems. ' 339 This conclu-
sion, however, ignores the fact that since the mid 1980s the computer
industry companies, such as Microsoft, have provided their entire appli-
cation portfolios for both the DOS and Apple platforms. Although in
the same opinion the Federal Circuit found William Snider to be a com-
petent expert and characterized him as a "certified computer-software
programmer with many years of experience, 34 ° the Federal Circuit
apparently thought he had no knowledge of the computer industry
beyond those products he personally designed. Even so, as the Federal
Circuit mentioned earlier in American Imaging Services, Co., "[t]his evi-
dence may be derived from the prior art teachings, the knowledge of one
of ordinary skill in the art, or from the nature of the problem to be
solved. ' 341 William Snider's knowledge of capabilities in the industry,
coupled with the abundance of products available on both platforms,
would seem to fit in one of the latter two categories of combination of
references.
333. No. 99-1485, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 13949 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2000).
334. Id. at *19-20.
335. Id. at *2.
336. Id. at *3-4.
337. Id. at *21.
338. Id. at *19.
339. Id. at *20.
340. Id. at *22.
341. Id. at *16.
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D. Federal Circuit Solutions
Especially when dealing, with new and unfamiliar technologies, the
Federal Circuit has gone too far in protecting against hindsight. As a
result, proving obviousness has now become practically impossible.342
The inherent danger in allowing hindsight to creep into the reasoning of
the court is the relative ease of finding an invention obvious after all the
pieces have been disclosed.34 3 "Combining prior art references without
evidence of such a suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply takes the
inventor's disclosure as a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to
defeat patentability - the essence of hindsight."1344 Moreover, one com-
mentator has noted that the Federal Circuit rarely overturns a jury's fac-
tual determination supporting Non-obviousness, and juries tend to favor
patentees on validity issues.345 Although the recent case of Dickenson v.
Zurko modified the standard of review for USPTO factual determina-
tions, 35 U.S.C. § 103 will probably not affect business method patents
to the extent that those patents are a computer implementation of
existing business processes. 346 Furthermore, to the extent that most
businesses use computers extensively, a person of ordinary skill, given
the opportunity, will computerize any procedure that can be computer-
ized, regardless of the absence of a "suggestion or motivation" in the
prior art references.3 47 In light of this inherent or implicit motivation,
the Federal Circuit should abandon its contrary presumption for com-
puter-implemented business methods, and adopt the presumption that a
person of ordinary skill in the art is motivated to computerize existing
business methods.
V. BUSINESS METHODS AND THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE
The major concern regarding computer-implemented business
method patents is that these patents are merely old ideas being applied to
a computer or to the Internet.348 Many practitioners and commentators
fear that our current patent system is incapable of finding a business
method patent obvious,349 believing the problem lies within the USPTO
342. Kasdan, supra note 319, at 165.
343. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
344. Id.
345. Stem, supra note 311, at 141.
346. Id. at 142.
347. Id. at 142 n.147.
348. William D. Wiese, Death of a Myth: The Patenting of Internet Business Models After
State Street Bank, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PRop. L. REV. 17, 43 (2000). See also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263,
279 (2000).
349. Stem, supra note 311, at 142.
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itself.350 For example, commentators often cite the following problems
as causes of poor quality business method patents: (1) lack of experi-
ence amongst patent examiners in business methods, i.e., little or no
business training;35 ' (2) inadequate prior art databases on the subject of
business methods;35 2 (3) numerous incentives built into USPTO funding
and examiner incentive structure to grant patents; 353 (4) lack of proper
classification techniques; 354 and (5) agency capture, where the agencies
are captured by the industries they regulate, as when employees from the
USPTO move into the private sector.355 These criticisms, however, are
not confined to computer-implemented business methods.356 In fact, as
a matter of course, the USPTO tends to be the subject of such criticism
during periods of expansion of new technology.35 ' For instance, during
the period just after Chakrabarty for biotechnology (and more recently
in the software industry) critics have claimed the USPTO will grant
overly broad patents as a result of the aforementioned issues.358 There-
fore, while these issues should (and are) being addressed by the
USPTO,3 59 the criticism tends not to indicate a problem that is specific
to computer-implemented business methods, but exists with all new
areas of technology.
A. USPTO Initiatives
After the development of a new category of technology, the patent
system generally needs time to adjust.36 0 In 1997, the USPTO opened a
new class for business method patents Class 705, to better address the
problems specific to computer-implemented business method technol-
ogy. 36 1 In furtherance of this effort, the USPTO has created a compre-
hensive training regimen for existing and new examiners in Workgroup
350. See, e.g., Kasdan, supra note 319, at 177-83. See generally Robert P. Merges, As Many
as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999).
351. Kasdan, supra note 319, at 177.
352. Merges, supra note 350, at 590.
353. Id. (stating that the USPTO's incentive system favors granting over rejecting patents);
Kasdan, supra note 319, at 178 (USPTO is currently funded through application, issuance, and
maintenance fees).
354. Kasdan, supra note 319, at 178 (also noting that even if the proper classification
techniques were available, reliable searches would still not be feasible because of the tremendous
volume of prior art being generated).
355. Id. at 176-77.
356. Merges, supra note 350, at 590.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See generally USPTO White Paper, supra note 3.
360. Merges, supra note 350, at 590.
361. USPTO White Paper, supra note 3, at 6.
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2760 (Class 705 is a member of Workgroup 2760).362 Furthermore, all
allowed applications for patents on business methods will be subject to a
"second look" by a senior examiner.363 The USPTO has also improved
prior art databases and has signed an agreement with the Information
Technology Association of America to help examiners get access to
additional databases and prior art.3 64 However, many critics say that
regardless of the volume of prior art, patent quality will still suffer due
because the examiners simply don't have the time to perform proper and
through searches.365
B. Budget Restrictions
Almost all critics agree that budget restrictions are a problem. In
1991, Congress required the USPTO to be self-funding from patent fees
alone, thereby cutting the Patent Office off from the benefit of general
tax revenues.366 At the same time, Congress allowed a surcharge to be
added to the patent fees until the end of 1998.367 That surcharge, how-
ever, which generated $119,000,000 in the 1998 fiscal year, expired in
October of that year. 368 But fiscal year 2000 will be the first year that a
portion or the USPTO's fees will not be diverted to the general fund
which, in 1998 fiscal terms, would mean and additional $71,000,000; in
revenue thus resulting in about a $50,000,000 shortfall.3 69 While a com-
plete analysis of the USPTO budget is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, the views of participants in the USPTO's roundtable discussion on
business method patents identified lack of resources as a major issue.37°
Moreover, if the Class 705 staffing plan is any indication, the USPTO is
preparing for a lean year: while the USPTO recognizes the need for
additional examiners in Class 705, the current staffing plan is to transi-
tion experienced examiners from other groups and only hire sufficient
362. Id. at 13.
363. PTO: Panel Explores Validity of PTO Practices in Examining Business Method Patents,
BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (Aug. 8, 2000), LEXIS BNAPTO File.
364. Interview by Stephen Pizzo, O'Reilly Network, with Q. Todd Dickinson, Director of
USPTO (May 24, 2000), available at http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/222.
365. PTO: Panel Explores Validity of PTO Practices in Examining Business Method Patents,
BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (Aug. 8, 2000) LEXIS, BNAPTO File.
366. Gleick, supra note 8, at 47.
367. Revision of Patent Fees for Fiscal Year 1999, 63 Fed. Reg. 39,731 (July 24, 1998).
368. Id.
369. PTO: PTO Fees Will Remain with Agency, Under FY 2000 Budget Plan, Dickinson Says,
BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (Feb. 2, 1999) LEXIS BNAPTO File.
370. See generally PTO: Panel Explores Validity of PTO Practices in Examining Business
Method Patents, BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (Aug. 8, 2000) LEXIS
BNAPTO File.
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371Class 705 examiners to cover attrition and modest expansion.
C. Patent Examiner Staffing
At the same time, the USPTO reports that for the second year in a
row, over 700 new examiners were hired, exceeding that number by one
hundred in 1999.372 While critics charge that the examiners involved in
business method patent applications do not have enough knowledge of
business processes, the USPTO has responded by increasing the number
of examiners with three or more years of business experience.373 Cur-
rently, of the fifty-three patent examiners in Class 705, fourteen (or
about twenty-five percent) have business experience that pertains
directly to the examination of business method patents.37 4 Furthermore,
Class 705 staffing may be reflective of the ratio of business method
patents to all utility patents.
For example, in 1999, the total number of patents filed with the
USPTO was 289,488, of which 270,646 were filed for Utility patents.375
Of these, 2,658 applications were directed to Class 705 subject matter,
comprising less than one percent of the total number of patent applica-
tions, and less than one percent of Utility applications.376 Additionally,
the number of patents granted from Class 705 is not quite as large as
some critics would have the public think.377 In 1998, 741 business
method patents were issued; in 1999, the number issued was 1,001, and
1,056 were granted for fiscal year 2000.378 Furthermore, the rate of
issuance of business method patents remains significantly below that of
patents in general, as the rate of issuance for all patents has remained the
same for the past twenty-five years at sixty-seven percent, while the rate
of issuance for business method patents in 1999 was fifty-seven
percent.379
D. Patent Office Standard for Non-obviousness
The USPTO uses the same criteria as the Federal Circuit in deter-
371. USPTO White Paper, supra note 3, at 11. Hiring additional Class 705 examiners is not
the focus of the plan.
372. USPTO Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1999, at 7 (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov.
373. USPTO White Paper, supra note 3, at 10.
374. Id.
375. USPTO Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1999 (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., John T. Aquino, Patently Permissive: PTO Filings Up After Ruling Expands
Protection for Business and Net Software, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 30.
378. 2000 USPTO, Mid Year Report, Patents Counts by Class by Year: January 1977 -
December 2000 (Mar. 2001).
379. Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5.
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mining obviousness of an application for a patent:38 0 "Office policy has
consistently been to follow Graham v. John Deere Co., in the considera-
tion and determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. ' '381 Simi-
larly, Graham's secondary consideration must be evaluated by
examiners when such evidence is submitted.382 While an examiner
could use secondary consideration to demonstrate that someone of ordi-
nary skill in the art would know to combine or modify a reference, evi-
dence of long-felt need or the failed attempts of others is not likely to be
available in an industry so new and fast paced as the internet. 38 3 This is
particularly true in light of the fact that on the Internet, a new develop-
ment has a lifetime of about two years.384
E. Combination of Prior Art References at the Patent Office
Furthermore, the USPTO uses the same Federal Circuit guidelines
when confronting the combination of references; references must have
some suggestion or motivation indicated in the references themselves, or
in the ordinary skill in relevant art.385 But as seen in the Federal Circuit
cases, providing the required evidence of the ordinary skill in the art
necessarily requires providing "objective evidence. ' 386 "Objective evi-
dence" has come to mean a printed publication, something that poses a
special problem in terms of software and computer-implemented busi-
ness methods.387 Much of the material relied on by inventors in the area
of computer-implemented business methods does not exist in a printed
form, or is located in areas that the USPTO is not likely to look.388
Given the similarity of the approaches in both the Federal Circuit and
the USPTO, and the standard of review after Zurko, it is hard to under-
stand why the Federal Circuit would compel the issuance of any patent
that the USPTO has found to be obvious. The Federal Circuit, however,
continues to do so when there is a combination of references without an
explicit suggestion to combine.389
380. Kasdan, supra note 319, at 173.
381. USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2141 (7th ed. rev. 2000).
382. Id.
383. Kasdan, supra note 319, at 164-65.
384. Gleick, supra note 8, at 49.
385. USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2143.01 (7th ed. rev. 2000).
386. See generally id.
387. Internet Society Panel on Business Method Patents, supra note 5.
388. Id.
389. See, e.g., In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2002]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
VI. PROTECTION AGAINST BAD BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
A. Reexamination
Alternative protections exist for infringers of obvious business
method patents. For instance, the USPTO has a reexamination proce-
dure that third parties can use to compel a reexamination of an existing
patent by raising a new issue of patentability which typically includes
submitting prior art. 3 While one aspect of the reexamination process is
to build a larger prior art database at the USPTO, critics of the procedure
point out that because of an estoppel effect built into the procedure,
there will be no encouragement to send in valuable prior art.39' Essen-
tially, any art submitted to the USPTO for consideration under reexami-
nation cannot be used in a later proceeding, such as an infringement
action.39 Potential infringers will likely save their best art for litigation,
thereby rendering the existing reexamination procedure virtually
useless.393
B. First Inventor Defense Act of 1999
An additional protection called the First Inventor Defense Act of
1999 was enacted as part of the American Inventors Act of 1999. 391
Relating only to business method patents, the Act provides a defense for
alleged infringers if they can show that they reduced the invention to
practice one year before the filing of the patent and used the invention
commercially before the filing date.395 While the First Inventor Defense
Act seems to be a good first step, the protection is likely to affect a very
narrow group, and therefore does not truly address the obviousness
issue.
C. Business Method Improvement Act of 2000
Interestingly, Representatives Rich Boucher and Howard Berman
introduced a bill into Congress on October 3, 2000.396 House bill H.R.
5364, titled the "Business Method Improvement Act of 2000," inter alia,
would allow for a post issuance opposition proceeding up to nine
months after the patent grant, require the publishing of the application
390. USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2209 (7th ed. rev. 2000).
391. PTO: Panel Explores Validity of PTO Practices in Examining Business Method Patents,
BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (Aug. 8, 2000), LEXIS, BNAPTO File.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (First
Inventors Defense Act codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2000)).
395. Id. at § 273(b)(1).
396. PTO: Bill Would Tighten PTO Procedure for Issuing Business Method Patents, BNA
PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (Oct. 4, 2000), LEXIS, BNAPTO File.
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despite foreign filings, change the burden of proof from "clear and con-
vincing" to "preponderance of the evidence," require applicants to dis-
close the extent to which they searched for prior art, and, most
disturbingly, create a presumption of obviousness for business methods
where the only novel feature is the application of a computer. 397 The
bill would add the following language to 35 U.S.C. § 103(d)(1):
If the subject matter within the scope of a claim addressed to a busi-
ness method invention would be obtained by combining or modifying
one or more prior art references, and ... any of those prior art refer-
ences discloses a business method which differs from what is claimed
only in that the claim requires a computer technology to implement
the practice of the business method invention, the invention shall be
presumed obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the invention was made.398
Although this proposed section appears to solve a problem inherent in
the combination of references with respect to computer-implemented
business methods, the result goes well beyond: Such an addition to 35
U.S.C. § 103 would effectively make every computer implemented busi-
ness method patent useless. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 103 not only
applies to prosecution of patents, but also serves as an affirmative
defense to infringement litigation.399 But in an infringement situation,
what this proposed section does is effectively to require the patentee to
not only meet the burden of proving infringement, but also prove his
patent is Non-obvious, and thus valid. Similarly, such a situation is in
direct contradiction to the long standing and sensible rule that a patent is
presumptively valid and that the burden of proving invalidity lies with
the party asserting invalidity.400 As a result, holders of business method
patents would be less likely to enforce their rights, thus effectively over-
ruling State Street.
Representative Berman, in introducing the bill, stated that its main
purpose was to increase the quality of business method patents, the
importance of which is tied to securing the value of companies with
intellectual property.40 1 If business method patents are indeed being
issued based on insufficient information regarding prior art, there is sub-
stantial risk to the inventor that those who know of the "prior art" could
step forward at any time and invalidate the patent. This inherent uncer-
tainty means that investors cannot be confident that businesses will actu-
ally reap the returns they would normally expect from patented
397. See H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
398. Id. at 15.
399. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 273 (1994).
400. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
401. 146 Cong. Rec. E1659 (2000).
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inventions.4 °2
But the presumption of obviousness included in the bill will cer-
tainly devalue the patent in light of the higher burden involved in enforc-
ing the patent against an infringer. Furthermore, at every turn the
patentee will have to defend the validity of the patent, including both
actions by the patentee (such as initial prosecution, reissue, obtaining a
correction of a minor error) and third party activities (such as infringe-
ment, and reexamination). Therefore, it is doubtful that the presumption
of obviousness will reduce the uncertainty or increase the value of a
business method patent.
The rationale behind the bill ignores the possibility that computer-
implemented business methods may exist that are truly Useful, Novel,
and Non-obvious. In fact, what may be truly novel about many com-
puter-implemented business methods is how they are actually imple-
mented. But even if the implementation required a indisputable advance
in technology, the fact that the overall invention would be labeled a
"business method" would invoke the presumption. Such a patent system
would bring back the categorical method of determining what is patenta-
ble subject matter, the very standard that State Street sought to erase.
There is a considerable difference between a presumption that all
business methods patents are per se obvious and a presumption that
practitioners of computer-implemented business methods are motivated
to computerize business methods. First, the latter presumption does not
create a new burden for the patent holder of proving validity during
litigation or such proceedings as re-examination. Secondly, the latter
presumption does not ignore truly Novel and Non-obvious business
methods by presuming them as obvious. The presumption that practi-
tioners are motivated to computerize business methods only seeks to
establish the ordinary skill in the art. The party attacking the Non-obvi-
ousness of a computer-implemented business method, however, would
still need to demonstrate that both the business method and the specific
computer-implementation of that method are obvious. In contrast, in the
case of the Business Method Improvement Act, if the invention fits into
the "business method" category, then it is per se obvious.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many practitioners believe that the Non-obviousness standard is
inappropriate for software, and to the same extent computer-imple-
mented business methods, because of the incremental and collective
nature of the development of those technologies. Considering the three
402. Id.
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basic conditions for patentability, namely Eligibility/Utility, Novelty,
and Non-obviousness, the balance of emphasis has clearly changed to
Non-obviousness for software and computer implemented business
methods. Where 35 U.S.C. § 101 eligibility used to provide the highest
hurdle for applicants for patents, State Street and the Diehr progeny
have removed the patentable subject matter barrier. Novelty, or more
specifically anticipation, is fairly rare in an area that bridges different
technologies such as computer implemented business methods. As a
result, Non-obviousness has become somewhat of the last guardian of
the quality of business method patents.
As discussed infra, establishing the obviousness of a computer-
implemented business method under the current Federal Circuit and
USPTO standards is nearly impossible. Protection against the award of
patents for inventions and technologies that are already a part of the
public domain is paramount to ensuring the high quality of patents and
the patent system. Blanket approaches that seek to formally disfavor the
award of patents for computer-implemented business methods, such as
the proposed Business Method Improvement Act of 2000, go too far in
the opposite direction. Such approaches ignore the possibility and the
existence of important advances in computer-implemented business
methods that are deserving of patent protection. But because of the
unique merging of at least two areas of technology, proper decisions
regarding the obviousness of computer-implemented business methods
requires the adoption of a presumption that computer and internet pro-
gramming practitioners are inherently motivated to computerize busi-
ness methods.
While many have criticized the USPTO for awarding allegedly
"bad" patents on computer-implemented business methods, the Patent
Office is not solely to blame. While taking positive steps to improve the
examination process for computer-implemented business method appli-
cations, the Patent Office uses the same standards used in the Federal
Circuit with regard to obviousness. Maybe the more appropriate ques-
tion should be, "why is the Federal Circuit willing to grant so many
patents that the USPTO rejected?"
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